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MUTUAL OF OMAHA INS. Co. v. RUSSELL

Aviation Flight Insurance And The
Law Of Reformation
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Russell'
"Does the speed of the modern jet age and the restless, irrepressible, increased tempo of all who are in its vortex impose on a
flight insurer the obligation toward prospective policy buyers of explaining the distinctive differences of the several available coverages ?"2
The court's negative response to this eloquently presented, but oversimplified issue in Russell represents a step backward from the steadily
growing case law affording greater protection to the consumer, even
from his own contracts.8
Mrs. Russell was to fly from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lubbock,
Texas, to attend her brother's funeral. While passing one of the defendant insurer's vending machines in the Kansas City air terminal,
it was decided that Mrs. Russell should have flight insurance to cover
her during the trip. The machine was equipped to dispense insurer's
policy T-20. This very limited policy covered only accidents occurring
aboard an airplane or in going to or from an airport in an established
limousine. The policy was to remain in effect for the round trip or for
twelve months, whichever occurred first.

1. 402 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969).
2. Id. at 340.
3. See, e.g., American Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bottum, 371 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1967);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See generally
Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 76 YALx L.J. 485 (1967) ; Donnelly, After the Fall of the Citadel: Exploitation
of the Victory or Consideration of All Interests?, 19 SYR. L. REv. 1 (1967) ; Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rzv. 791
(1966) ; Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALz L.J. 745 (1967).
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Not having the correct change to operate the machine, the
Russells stepped to defendant's nearby sales booth which bore a sign
reading "Flight Insurance" and was attended by a salesgirl. Mr.
Russell asked for either "flight insurance" or insurance that would
cover his wife on her round trip flight.
The insurer sold eleven different types of coverage from the sales
booth. Without asking Mrs. Russell what type of coverage she desired, the salesgirl produced an application form for type T-18 which
she completed in response to Mrs. Russell's answers. When asked
how long Mrs. Russell would be gone, it was decided that four days
should be allowed to cover the round trip. The salesgirl inserted four
days in the appropriate block on the application and presented it to
Mrs. Russell for her signature.4
Mrs. Russell arrived safely in Lubbock. The airliner in which
Mrs. Russell was returning to Kansas City crashed shortly before
midnight of the fourth day after she had purchased her insurance
policy. When the defendant denied liability on the basis that the
policy had lapsed, plaintiff brought suit seeking either to have the
policy construed to cover Mrs. Russell's death or to have the policy
reformed to provide coverage for the return flight. The district judge
held that the unambiguous contract did not cover the accident as
written.5 He did hold, however, that the contract should be reformed
to cover the accident. He found that in view of the fact that the coverage of flight insurance is generally known, there exists a positive duty to
explain the differences between a short term accident policy that the
6
insurer attempts to sell and the more generally known flight insurance.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court
recognized that traditional notions of the non-variability of the written
contract produce hardships, but found that such a duty of explanation ". . . would be fraught with great danger to the stability of
contracts." 7 The court's decision, though supportable within the traditional principles of the law of reformation, is a departure from the
liberal construction in favor of the insured in aviation flight insurance contracts. It is the purpose of this note to demonstrate that
there are valid reasons for extending the remedy of reformation beyond
its traditionally narrow limits.
This particular body of insurance law is relatively new and the
cases are not yet numerous. The extensive use of vending machines
in selling flight insurance has been a significant factor in the litigation
to date. It is appropriate to note that all cases of flight insurance
discussed herein involve sales by vending machines. Before Russell,
the cases could be divided into four categories." In two of these
categories the insurance company was the perennial victor. In the
4. The insurance form, as filled in for Mrs. Russell, is reproduced in 402 F.2d
at 341 n.5.
5. 402 F.2d at 342.
6. Id. at 342, 343 n.9.
7. Id. at 346.
8. Flight insurance policies have also involved the question of reasonable notice
to the insurer. See Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Brunke, 276 F.2d 53
(5th Cir. 1960) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1956).
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other two categories the insured was the consistent winner in one and
suffered only a single significant defeat in the other.
The easiest category to explain is that which deals with the
maximum amount of flight insurance in force on the insured at the
time of his death. This situation occurs when the insured purchases
more than the permissible maximum insurance stated on the vending
machine or in the policy. It is not surprising that there is no liability
for amounts in excess of the stated maximum. In Slater v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 9 the court held that the beneficiary of three $5,000
policies could not recover where the insured had already taken out
five other $5,000 policies naming his wife as beneficiary where there
was a limit of $25,000 to be in force at any one time.'0
Insurance companies have also been successful where the insured,
holding a round trip ticket, is killed or injured in an aviation related
activity which does not occur on the flight for which he holds a ticket.
In Thomas v. Continental Casualty Co.," insured, holder of a round
trip ticket from Witchita, Kansas, to San Salvador, purchased flight
insurance to cover his round trip. While in San Salvador, he was
killed when a private aircraft in which he was riding collided with an
airliner. The policy was to cover certain losses ".

.

. caused by an

accident occurring while this policy is in force and resulting directly
and independently of all other causes in loss covered by this policy
during the one way or round trip stated in the schedule for which a
transportation ticket has been issued to the insured. ... ""2 In affirming summary judgment for the insurer, the court of appeals held that
the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy was that it only covered
the enumerated losses during the air transportationfor which a ticket
had been purchased. Injuries sustained prior to return to the point
13
of origin wholly unrelated to this transportation were not covered.
Similarly, recovery has been denied a passenger injured inside an airport terminal during an hour's stopover between flights.' 4 The policy
covered accidents ".

.

. while a passenger . . . in an aircraft. .

..

5

The court rejected the argument that since plaintiff was in the air
terminal as an incident to her flight that she was a passenger in an
aircraft within the meaning of the policy.'"
The insured's beneficiaries have been consistently successful where
the insured was killed on a flight other than the one on which he was
scheduled to fly or for which he had purchased a ticket. Flight
insurance policies generally limit coverage to the first one way or round
trip for which a ticket is held after purchase of insurance except that
if the original transportation ticket is exchanged for a new ticket, the
9. 277 App. Div. 79, 98 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1950).
10. See also Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951). In this
case, the insurer paid a $10,000 policy. It denied all liability on a second policy of
$20,000. Because the policy provided for maximum coverage of $25,000 per passenger,
suit was instituted by the beneficiary only to recover the $15,000 balance. Id. at 317.
11. 225 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1955).
12. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 801.
14. General Am. Indem. Co. v. Pepper, 161 Tex. 263, 339 S.W.2d 660 (1960).
15. Id. at 660 n.1.
16. Id. at 661, 662.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIX

substitute trip will be covered." In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Smith, 8
the court found that airlines did not customarily exchange tickets of
other airlines."9 The insured's failure to exchange the ticket in no way
affects the risks of the insurance company. As far as the insurer is
concerned, the risk is no greater if a new ticket is purchased from the
proceeds of a cashed-in ticket, or if the second ticket was merely
obtained in a direct exchange for the first ticket.2" The courts have
not permitted the insurer to escape liability because of this "ticket
exchange" provision whether or not the second ticket was for a substitute flight 2 ' or where there has been a change in itinerary or route
taken. This result is limited to cases where
the insurance contains a
2
provision for coverage of substitute flights. 1
The fourth category of cases involves an insured who is killed
while a passenger on a non-scheduled airline. In these instances, the
courts generally allow recovery despite the existence of the requirement that the insured be travelling on a scheduled airline at the time
of his death.2 4 Recovery has been permitted where decedent purchased
flight insurance from a vending machine located in front of the counter
at which she had purchased her ticket on a non-scheduled airline.2 5
In Lachs v. Fidelity Casualty Co.,"8 the court reasoned that by placing
its machine in front of the counter of a non-scheduled airline, the
insurer had invited the airline's passengers to buy its insurance. The
term "scheduled airline" became ambiguous and presented a question
of fact to be resolved by the jury. 27 Although the court indicated
that the insurer might escape ambiguity by providing a definition of
17. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315, 317 n.1 (10th Cir. 1951);
Rosen v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 162 F. Supp. 211, 212 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ; Steven v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 292, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180 (1962).
18. 189 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951), criticised in 36 MARQ. L. Rzv. 109 (1952).

19. 189 F.2d at 318.

20. Id.
21. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962), commented on in 16 STAN. L. Rlv. 191 (1963).
22. Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951); Rosen v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 162 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
23. In Tannenbaum v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 Misc. 2d 860, 214 N.Y.S.2d 988
(Sup. Ct. 1961), the court denied recovery where insured purchased insurance for a
round trip flight from Dallas to Chicago and traded in his ticket in Chicago, purchased a ticket to Houston, flew from Chicago to Fort Worth, took a bus to Dallas,
flew to Houston and was killed in a return flight to Dallas. The court distinguished
both Rosen and Smith on the ground that in those cases, there was no question of
returning to the original point or deviating beyond such point, and the policies in
those cases provided coverage for substitute and side trip coverage not included in the
Continental policy.
24. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Messina
v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd,
350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966) ; Steven v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) ;Lachs v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555, reargument denied, 306 N.Y. 941, 120
N.E.2d 216 (1954). Contra, Thompson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 159,
148 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958). See also McBride v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 461, 72 N.E.2d 98 (1947), where the court held that
insured's death in a chartered plane was not covered under an ordinary life insurance
policy where the policy excluded aviation risks except as a passenger on a regularly
scheduled passenger flight of a commercial aircraft.
25. Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
26. Id.
27. 118 N.E.2d at 559.
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"scheduled airlines,"2 later courts have not been inclined to allow the
insurer to avoid liability merely by providing such a definition.
In Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Commander,2" insured purchased
a ticket from an American Airlines ticket counter for a flight from
Newark, New Jersey, to Provincetown, Massachusetts. The flight
was from Newark to Boston to Provincetown. The Newark to Boston
leg was via American Airlines. The trip from Boston to Provincetown
was via the Provincetown-Boston Airline, a non-scheduled airline.
American booked passage for insured on the Provincetown-Boston
line. The insurance policy that was filled in to provide coverage between Newark and Provincetown provided coverage while a passenger
on a flight operated by a "Civilian Scheduled Airline" or ". . . while
riding in or on a conveyance under the complete control of the Insured,
provided or arranged for, directly or indirectly, by such airline ...
""
Fidelity denied liability when insured was killed on the non-scheduled
airline. In affirming, the court of appeals agreed with the finding of
the district court that the various provisions of the insurance contract
were disjunctive and allowed recovery notwithstanding the fact that
the "conveyance" 3 on which insured was riding when killed was a nonscheduled airline. 1
The policy purchased by insured in Messina v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Association3 2 provided coverage ". . . while riding
as a passenger in . . . an aircraft operated on a regular, special or
chartered flight (a) by a scheduled airline . . . (d) by, or contracted
for by, the Military Air Transportation Service (MATS) of the
United States. . . ." 3 The insurance was to cover a flight from
Tachikawa Air Force Base, Japan, to Washington, D.C. Insured
flew from Tachikawa to Travis Air Force Base, California, on a
MATS chartered flight. He then purchased a ticket from San Francisco International Airport to Washington, D.C., upon his arrival
at Travis. He also purchased a ticket on a Travis Transportation
Company flight to carry him the sixty-seven miles from Travis to the
San Francisco Airport. Travis Transportation Company was not a
scheduled airline nor was it contracted for by MATS. It was permitted to operate out of the air base under a revocable permit issued
by the Base Commander. Finding various ambiguities in the policy
as well as the absence of a clear warning of a gap in coverage, the
court found that insured was covered by the terms of the contract.
The court concluded that various references to "special" and "chartered" flights would lead a reasonable person in insured's position to
believe that the flight was covered. 4
The only reported case in which an insurance company was successful in defending on the ground that the aircraft in question was
28. Id. at 562.

29. 231 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956).
30. Id. at 350.

31. Id. at 351.

32. 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966).
33. 228 F. Supp. at 867.
34. Id. at 868.
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not operated by a scheduled airline is Thompson v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. 5 Insured had purchased a standard vending machine policy which
limited coverage to aircraft operated by a "Scheduled Air Carrier."
Another clause defined an aircraft operated by a scheduled air carrier.
by govIt specifically excluded aircraft operated by a carrier licensed
ernment agencies as irregular or non-scheduled air carriers.3 6 Insured
purchased an agency ticket which was later exchanged for a carrier
ticket for Peninsula Airlines, an irregular air carrier which had no
established route. It appears from the opinion that such planes wait
at an airport until sufficient agency tickets are sold for a given time
and destination. If insufficient tickets were sold, Peninsula was not
obligated to make the flight and could cancel at its prerogative. Plaintiff
argued that since a time was stated on the agency ticket, the airplane
was "scheduled." The court held that the definition of "an aircraft
operated by a scheduled air carrier" was not ambiguous and was
controlling.- 7 The court carefully distinguished Lachs v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co."8 on the narrow ground that the court in Lachs was
iaced with interpretation of the term "Civilian Scheduled Airline" as
"scheduled air carrier" provision before the Illinois
contrasted with the 39
court in Thompson.
The factual distinctions between Thompson and other cases permitting recovery for flights on non-scheduled airlines is significant in
assessing the weight to be accorded Thompson in a survey of aviation
flight insurance cases. There is no evidence in Thompson to indicate
that the insurance was purchased from a vending machine located
directly in front of the ticket booth of a non-scheduled air carrier
which one court found to constitute an offer or invitation to purchase
insurance. ° There was also no question of the trip being partially via
a covered scheduled air carrier and partially by a non-scheduled
carrier;41 nor was a question of unanticipated substitute transportation presented. 42 The limitation of coverage was clearly stated in
Thompson and the scheduled carrier limitation was not ambiguous
when read in conjunction with other portions of the policy or in view
of the surrounding circumstances.4 3 Furthermore, the lack of published
schedules and the terminable nature of the ticket were warning to the
insured that the carrier was non-scheduled, notwithstanding his lack
of knowledge of the type of license under which the airline operated.
35. 16 Ill. App. 2d 159, 148 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
36. 148 N.E.2d at 12, 13.
37. Id. at 13, 14.
38. 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
39. 148 N.E.2d at 14.
40. Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
41. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Messina v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964) ; Steven v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
42. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1962).
43. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Messina v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964) ; Steven v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
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Thus, Thompson does not represent a departure from a rule of liberal
construction of ambiguous contracts in favor of the insured.44
There are other considerations to which the courts have given
attention in permitting recovery by the beneficiary. Two courts have
given weight to the fact that at the time the insured boarded the fatal
flight, the insured had already mailed the policy to his beneficiary.45
Thus, even if the insured had given further thought to his coverage
when boarding a second aircraft, he would have been unable to consult
his policy. In Russell, had the insured attempted to ascertain from
insurer's agent in Lubbock whether the return flight was covered, the
sales person at ,the booth would not likely have been able to give
assistance, not knowing which of the eleven policies was purchased.
Courts have also been concerned with the question of whether a
reasonable person in insured's position would feel that he was covered.
Thus, the court in Lachs wrote that the insurance policy ". . . must be
read through the eyes of the average man on the street or the average
housewife who purchases it."46 Other courts have also given consideration to the expectation of the insured4 7 and the policy's dominant
purpose to provide round trip coverage.4"
None of the cases discussed involved reformation of the contract,
but were concerned instead with construction of the contract. It cannot be doubted that the Russell policy was on its face clear and unequivocal - the insured was to be covered for a period of ninety-six
hours. No rules of construction could bring the insured within the terms
of the policy. Arriving at this conclusion, however, does not always
leave the insured without a remedy. The ingenuity of equity courts
may sometimes provide relief through the doctrine of reformation.
Reformation of a contract is proper when for various reasons, the
contract as written does not express the intent of the parties.49 Its
purpose is ". . . to make the policy express the true contract which
the parties intended and desired to put in writing."5
44. Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865, 868
(D.D.C. 1964) ; Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (1962). See also 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcTcic § 7387
at 42 (1943) ; 1 G. CoucH ON INSURANCE § 15:14 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1959) [hereinafter cited as --- CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d §
]; W. VANCE ON INSURANCE § 136
at 809 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951).
45. Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865, 869
(D.D.C. 1964) ; Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 186 (1962).
46. 118 N.E.2d at 558.
47. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315, 318 (10th Cir. 1951).
48. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 288-89, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 176-77 (1962).
49. See generally 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAC'rIcE § 7609 (1943);
17 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d § 66:2, supra note 44; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 491, 504, 505 (1932).
ON INSURANCE 2d § 66:2, supra note
BEADLES, LAW AND THE LirE INSURANCE CONTRACT

50. 17 CoucH
W.

44. See also J. GREIDER &
455, 456 (Rev. ed. 1968)

("The purpose of reformation is not to make a new contract but to reform the one
presently existing so that it will be in the form in which it should have been expressed
in the first place.").
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The remedy is a limited one and wisely so. Too liberal an
5
application of the doctrine would circumvent the parol evidence rule '
and invite litigation from all parties who are disappointed because
their agreement does not cover a given situation. It would seem,
however, that the motive in limiting the remedy should not be to
preserve the integrity of the parol evidence rule itself, but rather to
preserve the reason behind the rule - the integrity of the fairly made
written contract. Equity's jurisdiction to reform a contract is generally
limited to situations where
. . . either through fraud of one and mistake of the other [of
the parties], or mutual mistake, or because of the inadvertence,
accident, mistake, or fraud of the scrivener in reducing the contract to writing, it does not embody therein the actual contract
intended, or fully set forth the same . .5
In Russell, the district judge found a positive duty to explain
the difference between the two principal insurance policies.5" The
failure to give such an explanation was a "constructive fraud"5 4 upon
which to base reformation.55 The circuit court, however, found that
no such duty existed, it being an impractical requirement, particularly
in view of the haste with which such policies are purchased. It would
seem, however, that the "time factor" argument is more appropriately
made for imposing a duty than for not doing so. One who is concerned
with airline time schedules is unlikely to give a great deal of thought
to reading an insurance policy which he purchases as an after-thought,
particularly when he believes the policy is for a round trip flight. The
court indicated that there was a duty to explain the differences between the policies when there was an answer to an inquiry by a pros51. An exception to the parol evidence rule regarding the admissibility of parol
evidence in suits for reformation is found in the RESTATEMENT Ol CONTRACTS § 238
(1932): "Agreements prior to or contemporaneous with an integration are admissible
in evidence ... ; (c) to prove facts in a suit for rescission or reformation of the written instrument showing such mistake as affords grounds for the desired remedy. ..."
52. 17 Coucn ON INSURANCE 2d § 66:20, supra note 44. For Maryland cases
following this general proposition, see, e.g., Johnson v. Mutual Ins. Co., 175 Md. 543,
3 A.2d 460 (1939) (mistake must be mutual) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Metzger, 167
Md. 27, 172 A. 610 (1934) (clerical mistake justifies reformation, even though the
error was made by complainant's own clerk). See also RESTATEMENT O CONTRACTS
§ 491 (1932):
Where a written contract, conveyance or discharge owing to the fraud or
misrepresentation of one party and the mistake of the other, fails to express the
agreement which they had manifested an intent that the writing should express, the
latter can get a decree for reformation, unless precluded by the Statute of Frauds.
A further ground for reformation is found in RESTATEMENT OV CONTRACTS § 505
(1932), which provides that if, at the time of execution of a written instrument, one
party knows that the instrument does not express the intention of the other party,
knowing what that contention is, the latter may have the contract reformed. See
Portella v. Sonnenberg, 74 N.J. Super. 354, 181 A.2d 385, 388 (1962) (dictum)
Volker v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 314, 91 A.2d 883 (1952).
53. 402 F.2d at 342 n.9.
54. By constructive frauds are meant such acts or contracts, as, although not
originating in any actual or evil design, or contrivance to perpetuate a positive
fraud or injury upon other persons, or to violate private or public confidence, or
to impair or injure the public interests, deemed equally reprehensible with
positive fraud. . ..
1 J. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 258 (2d ed. 1839).
55. 402 F.2d at 340.
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pect or an affirmative statement was made by insured's agent indicating
that the policy would cover the round trip.5" It seems that these failures
were present in Russell, in substance if not in form. Producing a
form in response to a request for round trip coverage is indistinguishable from a response to an inquiry.
Reformation has been permitted in non-aviation situations similar
to Russell in which the insurance policy issued fell short of that which
was requested. In Portella v. Sonnenberg,5" insured requested an
insurance policy that would provide complete liability coverage for
his furniture store. The policy that was issued excepted elevator
coverage. When a person was injured on the elevator and insurer
denied liability, insurer was joined as a third party defendant in a suit
between the furniture store owner and the injured person. The lower
court resolved the factual dispute as to the underlying negotiation in
favor of the insured and granted reformation. In affirming, the appellate court held that in view of insured's request for and expectation
of complete coverage, insurer's agent had a duty to point out all exclusions clearly.5" Portella must be confined to the fact that the
exception in the policy was not manifestly clear to a layman,5 9 but the
case indicates that modern judicial thinking is looking toward reliance
in applying the reformation doctrine.
An analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose 0 has been suggested in urging that the
insured should be permitted to rely on the representations of the agent
with whom he deals. 6 Such an analogy seems reasonable. The sale
of insurance protection and the sale of goods are not so dissimilar that
different reasoning should be applied to the two areas; the justification
for permitting reliance in the insurance area may be even more compelling. In the sale of goods, the purchaser usually has some knowledge
of the product he is buying to put to a particular use. The drafting
of insurance contracts is often so complicated that even a well-educated
layman is often unable to interpret the document. In airline insurance,
even if the purchaser has the ability to interpret the document, he
frequently is unable to do so in the haste of "making connections."
The disappointed purchaser of goods can be made whole by an action
for damages for breach of warranty. He can be put in as good a position as if the goods had been fit for the purpose intended. The dis56. Id. at 346 n.22.

57. 74 N.J. Super. 354, 181 A.2d 385 (1962), commented on in 17 RUTGRs L.
Rzv. 470 (1963).
58. 181 A.2d at 388. But see Sardo v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 100 N.J. Eq. 332,
134 A. 774 (Ct. of Errors & Appeals 1926) in which the court refused to permit
reformation of a policy where the insured sought to insure the jewelry in his jewelry
store but instead received a policy covering securities. The court found that there

was no evidence of mutual mistake or that the insurer intended to issue any policy
other than the one actually issued. 134 A. at 775.

59. 181 A.2d at 390.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-315:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
60.

61. 17

RUTGERS

L. Rzv. 470. 474 (1963).
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appointed purchaser of flight insurance cannot. He loses the benefit
of the bargain he thought he had made. His only remedy appears to
be to rescind the contract and obtain a refund of his premiums, 2
hardly adequate when such insurance was purchased with the idea of
plugging gaps in his ordinary life insurance policy.63 This lack of a
meaningful remedy should be enough to justify extending the use of
the doctrine of reformation beyond its present limits.6 4
The mere mention of allowing oral representation to overcome
the written contract immediately brings to mind an abandonment of
the parol evidence rule. While parol evidence is admissible in a suit
for reformation,6" there is still a safeguard. In a suit for reformation,
the evidence of facts justifying reformation must be clear and convincing.66 Such a quantum of proof is necessary since the parol
evidence rule has already been invaded.67 Inasmuch as the quantum
of the evidence is equity's safeguard in preserving the integrity of
written contracts in suits for reformation, no great harm to the stability
of contracts is envisioned if the line is drawn here rather than severely
limiting the types of situations in which the remedy can be granted.
CONCLUSION

During the approximately two decades that flight insurance contracts have been the subject of litigation, courts have liberally construed
such policies in favor of the insured. In reaching these results, the
courts have not been unmindful of the circumstances attending the
purchase of such contracts, the fact that the policies are often mailed
to the beneficiary and are unavailable for reading if a question of
coverage arises, and what a reasonable person in the shoes of the
purchaser expects to obtain.
Where the insured has relied on the skill of the insurer's agent in
selecting a policy, and by the terms of the written contract is excluded
from coverage, he has not been so fortunate. Where the exclusion is
clear and unambiguous, rules construing contracts against the drafter
are of no help. In such an instance, the insured has two alternatives.
He may rescind the contract and be placed in the position in which
he would have been had he not entered the contract. Thus, he may
get approximately two dollars in premiums returned to him. Such a
62. W. VANCZ ON INSURANCE § 58, at 354 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951).
63. The primary reason for purchasing this type of insurance coverage is either
to provide for areas excluded from coverage by other existing policies, or to provide
additional security when embarking on air travel. Comment, Airplane Trip Insurance,
20 WASH. & LPE L. Rgv. 346, 354 (1963).
64. 17 RUTGERS L. Rzv. 470, 475 (1963).
65. See note 46 supra. For a discussion of parol evidence problems in suits for
reformation see Palmer, Reformation and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MiCH. L. Rgv.
833 (1967).
66. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1962) (oral
agreement must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not by a mere
preponderance of the evidence) ; First Nat'l Ins. Co. of America v. Norton, 238
F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1956) (evidence must be clear and convincing but does not have
to be uncontradicted) ; Olinger Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Christy, 139 Colo. 425, 342 P.2d
1000 (1959) (evidence must be beyond a reasonable doubt). See also 17 COUCH ON
INSURANcx 2d § 66:154, supra note 44; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 511 (1932).
67. 17 COUCH ON INSURANCr 2d § 66:154, supra note 44.
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remedy is grossly inadequate."8 His death in an airplane crash may
leave his family with no insurance protection.
He may also seek to have the contract reformed to conform to
what the parties intended. Unless a court can be convinced that there
was a mutual mistake, an error in reducing the agreement to writing,
or unilateral mistake coupled with fraud by the other party, this
remedy is foreclosed to him also. Thus, he is left with no satisfactory
remedy. This absence of a remedy is made necessary only by the courts'
strict adherence to existing principles of reformation. This rigid adherence to existing principles is inconsonant with recent judicial and legislative trends extending greater protection to the layman consumer.
There is some indication that reliance is becoming or should
become a factor in permitting reformation of an insurance contract
where no other remedy is effective. In such a situation, the weight,
credibility and sufficiency of the evidence would become a check as
effective as the parol evidence rule in maintaining the stability of the
written contract. Not only would such a change in the law of reformation leave the stability of well-made contracts untouched, but it would
go far to bring within the age of jets and vending machines the law
by which such contracts are governed. 9

68. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
69. Another solution to the problem may be found in the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. A recent New Jersey case permitted the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
bar a defense of non-coverage where the misrepresentation of insured's agent as to the
coverage was relied on to insured's detriment. The court acknowledged that its
holding, which would permit coverage to be expanded by the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, was contrary to the majority rule. Nevertheless, the court found such a
result to be compelled by "elementary and simple justice." Marr v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208, 218-19 (1969). For a discussion of Russell in which federal
legislation is proposed as the best solution to the problem see Note, Insurance Flight Policy - Air Insurer's Failure to Explain that Different Types of Coverage
Are Available Is Not Ground for Reformation, 21 ALA. L. Rzv. 389 (1969).

